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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Appellate jurisdiction is conferred pursuant to §78-22(3) (1) Utah Code Ann. .

This case was poured over to the Court

of Appeals pursuant to §78-2-2(4) Utah Code Ann.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant is in the business of providing cemetery and
mausoleum

spaces,

similar products.

funeral

markers,

caskets,

and

From 1972 to 1974, Defendant began a mausoleum

sales program called
depo. p. 12).

services,

"public relations sales program."

(Moore

Mausoleums were to be located at a Redwood Road

location and one at 3115 East 7800 South called the "Mountain
View" location. Under this program, one-half

the spaces of a

proposed mausoleum were sold to families before construction (Id.
at 9, 14-15).

Once one-half of the mausoleum spaces were sold,

construction would

begin.

(Id.)

This

is called

because the sale is made before the time of death.
The sales program

represented

"pre-need"
(Id. at 8.)

to consumers that the pre-need

price was at cost and did not include a profit.

(Id. at 9.)

Sometime in 1973 or 1974, a salesman for defendant,
Bill Nordin,

called on the Schoney family to sell them spaces

in a mausoleum.

(Nordin depo. p.8.)
1

After

hearing Nordin's

"usual presentation," the Schoneys purchased two spaces in an
unconstructed
plaintiff's

mausoleum.

Complaint-)

(Nordin

depo.

p.9;

Exhibit

The purchase agreement

1 to

(labeled the

"Mausoleum Estate Agreement") obligated defendant in part:
To provide use of the full service chapel . . .
•

•

•

To complete the mausoleum
with constructruction. . . within one year from the date
that the Public Relations Development Program on that is completed.
(Exhibit 1 to plaintiff's Complaint).

The contract does not

specify whether the spaces were to be at the Redwood Road or
Mountain View Mausoleum.
Nordin showed the Schoneys a drawing that laid out the
crypt locations in the mausoleum.

(George Schoney depo p. 10.)

George and Erma selected two specific crypts located
level".

(Id. at 10,11).

"at eye

George Schoney testified that the

mausoleum space he purchased was "the Memorial Estates in the
east

side"

(Id. at

19) commonly known as the Mountain View

location (Id. at 20).

See also George Schoney depo. p. 21, 22

"[the family] didn't want to be buried over there on the west
side

anyway.

. ."

Erma

Schoney

depo. p.

4-5,

9)

Nordin

represented that a chapel had been started at the Mountain View
location (Id. at 22). He further stated that the Schoneys would
have access to the Mountain View chapel and be able to have
funeral services at the chapel. (Id. at 22).
Nordin promised that the Schoneys would
the chapel at no charge

have use of

(Erma Schoney depo, p. 8).
2

He also

stated

that

the money

from the Schoney's

purchase would be

specifically used for construction of the mausoleum.

(Id.)

Paul

Moore, former general sales manager for defendant from 1960-1966,
and a sales representative from 1972-1974 (Moore depo. p. 4, 5)
confirmed that it was his understanding that the money would be
used for building the mausoleum.

(Id. at 9, 14, 15).

During Nordin's presentation, he showed the Schoneys
pictures of the chapel and proposed mausoleum at Mountain View.
(George Schoney depo. p. 9). Moore agreed that it was a standard
policy to show an artists drawing of what the mausoleum would
look like.

(Moore depo. p 22, 23). The drawing was identified

as Exhibit 1 to the Moore deposition.
Several months after the Schoneys had purchased preneed spaces at Mountain View, Erma's father (Clint Wheeler) died.
(Erma Schoney depo. p. 9). It had always been the intent of the
Schoneys and Erma's parents to be interred together at Mountain
View.

(Affidavit of Erma Schoney, 1/5/88 para. 1, 2).

Because

the Mountain View mausoleum was not built, Erma had no choice but
to

have

her

arrangement.
burial

was

father

in

the

ground

as

a

temporary

(Erma Schoney depo. p. 9). This temporary ground
induced

father] would
months."

buried

(Id.)

by

defendant's

only be there

promise

that

"he

[Ermafs

[i.e. in the ground] about six

(See also George Schoney depo. p. 41 "he would

be moved in six months.")

Erma and her family were "strongly

opposed to ground burial" for personal reasons.
affidavit, para. 5; Erma Schoney depo. p. 18.)
3

(Erma Schoney
Because the

Schoneys were assured that Clinton Wheeler's ground burial was
only temporary, no marker was placed on his grave.

(Affidavit of

Erma Schoney, para. 5).
After Clinton Wheeler's burial in 1974 , Erma and her
mother went to the Mountain View cemetery "lots of times" to "see
if they were building it [i.e. the mausoleum]."

(Erma Schoney

depo. p. 11). Erma was "very concerned" about it and "worried".
(Id.)

Erma asked the defendant when the mausoleum was to be

built. (Id.)

George also testified that he went "once a year" to

see about the building of the mausoleum (George Schoney depo. p.
40).

Defendant

"told George that it would be started in the

near future; this went on for 8 years.

(Id. at 42).

Eventually, George was told that "there wasn't enough
people

interested

mausoleum."

at

the

present

time

for them

to build a

(Id. at 48-49). George got the impression that "they

would never build it."

(Id.).

It was in 1981 that George

decided defendant wasn't going to build a mausoleum, and so he
and Erma and Mrs. Wheeler purchased alternate spaces at Sunset
Lawn mausoleum.

(Id. at p. 43, 45).

The Schoneys alleged that

this was on or before March 29, 1981. (Second Amended Complaint,
para. 11).
During

the

passing years, defendant

failed to keep

track of the unmarked 'grave of Clinton Wheeler.

(Affidavit of

Erma Schoney, para. 7). Erma and defendant disagreed as to where
Wheeler was buried.

(Erma Schoney depo. p. 16).

As a result,

defendant's agent "had to use a long metal probe to locate the
4

casket."

(Affidavit of Erma Schoney, para. 7; Erma Schoney depo.

p. 16).

Erma averred that "to disturb his grave in this manner

was very distressful to us."

(Id.).

Sometime prior to about 1977f the cemetery chapel at
Mountain View was completed.

The Schoneys

alleged

cemetery chapel was rented as office space.

that the

(Fifth Amended

Complaint, para. 31). This was conceded in Mr. Holt's deposition
where he stated that the salesmen "know that the area of the
building

that

will

eventually

house the pews

and

the whole

operation is currently office space..." (Holt depo. p. 42; R.
1399).

Defendant

instead

substituted

use

of L.D.S. chapels

which were provided to defendant free of charge.

(Id. at p. 44).

The chapel was rented to defendant's previous company, Security
National Life Insurance Co. (Quist depo. Ex. 1 and 2).

The total

proceeds received by defendant from renting the cemetery chapel
is at least $200,000.

(Quist depo. exhibits 3-11).

After the Schoneys decided that defendant was not going
to build a mausoleum at Mountain View in the foreseeable future,
they

purchased

substitute

mausoleum at Sunset Lawn.

mausoleum

spaces

in

an

existing

(Erma Schoney depo. p. 12).

averred that:
Before my mother died, we asked Memorial
Estates to release my father's body so it
would be placed next to his wife at Sunset
Lawn when she died.
Memorial Estates
refused.
Finally, on the morning of my
mother's funeral, they released his body.
This was severely distressing and upsetting
to us, to be faced with the inability to lay
my parents to rest together.
Even more
upsetting was the fact that my mother never
5

Erma

knew she would be able to be interred with
her husband.
(Affidavit of Erma Schoneyf paragraph 8.)

George testified that

"right up until the night before the funeral, we didn't know but
what we were going to have him in one place and her in another
place. . . " (Id.).

George confirmed that Erma "spent a lot of

nights worrying about it

. . .

it caused a lot of grief."

(George Schoney depo. p. 47-48).
George stated that he "still had the nightmare, until
we found another place [i.e. Sunset Lawn] that I could be there
any time, the same way."

(Id. at 46).

When defendant finally relented and allowed Mr. Wheeler
to be disinterred and transferred to Sunset Lawn, the Schoneys
learned that there had been water damage to Kr.

Wheeler's casket

due to what appeared to be poor materials used.

(George Schoney

depo. p. 4 7).

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Class Certification:
The Schoneys brought their claims individually and on
behalf of a class of pre-need consumers of defendant's services.
On February 10, 1983, the action was certified as a class action
by Judge Fishier. (R. 202). The class was defined as "all those
persons

who

have

signed

a

standard

form

agreement

purchase of mausoleum space from the defendant."
February 10, 19 84, defendant
tified. (R. 487).

for the

(R. 294). On

moved to have the class decer-

On June 24 f 1985, Judge Dee entered an order
6

decertifying the class. (R. 704).

Judge Dee refused to enter

findings

of law in

of

fact

decertification

and
order.

conclusions
(R.

681).

support

Plaintiffs

of the

successfully

obtained a writ of mandamus requiring Judge Dee to enter findings
of fact and conclusions of law to support decertification. (R.
998).

Judge

Dee's

findings

and conclusions

were

entered

on

December 4, 1985. (R. 1053).
Discovery:
Plaintiffs served interrogatories on defendant on June
17, 1982. (R. 12).

Defendant answered the interrogatories on

August 27,1982, approximately 26 days late. (R. 50).

Plaintiff

submitted to defendant a second request for documents on January
28, 1983. (R> 197). No answer has ever been filed.

The Schoneys

submitted a third request for documents on March 1,1983225).

(R.

No response has ever been filed.
Defendant submitted a second set of interrogatories on

July 11, 1983, to the Schoneys. (R. 328A).
30 days later on August 11, 1983.

They timely responded

(R. 356).

The initial round of discovery was completed by August
11, 1983.

No further discovery was conducted until June 12,

1987,

plaintiffs

when

submitted

another request for documents.

further

interrogatories

and

Defendant sought and received an

extension of time until* September 15, 1987, to answer discovery.
(R. 1121).

A discovery cut-off was imposed of December 8, 1987,

and a trial date of December 7, 1988 set.
did not answer by September 15.
7

(R. 1136).

Defendant

Finally, on October 28, 1987,

the Schoneys' counsel sent a letter reminding defendant of its
discovery obligation and delay. (R. 1164).

Defendant partially

answered plaintiff's discovery by mailing interrogatory answers
on November 24, 1987. (R. 1166).
discovery cut-off.

This was 13 days before

Plaintiff was forced to bring a motion to

compel further answers on December 8, 1987. (R. 1150).

This

motion was granted, in part, by order entered December 23, 1987.
The Schoneys also requested more time to do follow-up discovery
because of defendant's late and incomplete answers.

This request

was denied. (R. 1187).
Meanwhile, defendant sent discovery to plaintiffs on
June 26, 1987.

Plaintiffs' answers were filed (without objection

from defendant) on August 13, 1987.

Defendant claims to have

sent a final set of interrogatories and requests for documents to
plaintiffs' counsel on April 29, 1988.
June 20, 1988.

These were answered on

Because the answers were 18 days late, Judge

Moffat struck plaintiffs' complaint and entered default judgment
against them.
Trial Settings:
Plaintiff first certified the case for trial on Kay 3,
1983.

(R. 263). Defendant objected. (R. 269).

certified the case on September 13, 1983.

Plaintiff again

(R. 390). Upon Judge

Leary's poor health, plaintiff moved for a new trial judge to
avoid delay. (R. 522).
Plaintiffs certified the case as ready for trial on
April 22, 1986. (R. 1067).

3y scheduling order of September 22,
8

1986, the case was given a first place trial setting on February
9,

1987.

(R.

1069).

However,

effective January 31, 1987.

Judge

Dee

suddenly

Plaintiff requested a special pro

tempore judge to prevent delay of a trial. (R. 1085).
denied.

retired

This was

By scheduling order of May 14, 1987, the case was given

a trial date of August 24, 1987. (R. 1096).

Upon defendant's

request for a continuance, the trial date was changed to December
7, 1987. (R. 1136).

This was again changed to February 1, 1988

upon defendant's request. (R. 1139).

Upon the court's own

motion, the trial was continued. (R. 1301).

Upon plaintiff's

request (R. 1336 and 1338), the case was reset for trial on July
6, 1988. (R. 1360).
Summary Judgment:
On

February

10, 1984, defendant

moved

for

summary

judgment as to all causes of action in plaintiffs' Second Amended
Complaint. (R. 494).

On June 24, 1985, Judge Dee entered an

order denying defendant's motion. (R. 693).
second motion

Defendant filed a

for summary judgment as to all causes in this

complaint on December 29, 1987.(R. 1200).

This motion was in all

material respects the same as the February 10, 1987 motion. This
second motion was denied by Judge Moffat on January, 1988. (R.
1301).

Defendant filed a third motion for summary judgment on

June 14, 1988. (R. 136*3).

This motion was granted by Judge

Moffat as to all causes in plaintiffs' complaint on June 27,
1988. (R. 1377).

Q

POINT
DEFENDANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN REQUIRED TO PLACE
75% OF THE SCHONEY'S PAYMENTS IN TRUST UNDER
U.C.A. 22-4-1
A.

Claim for Breach of Trust - 22-4-1.
Utah Code Ann. §22-4-1 required defendant to maintain

75% of the money paid by pre-need plaintiffs in a trust.
statute

The

at the time of plaintiffs' purchase applied when "money

is paid for a purpose of finishing or performing funeral services
or the furnishing or delivery of any personal property, merchandise, or services of any nature to be conveyed or delivered at
any time.

. . for future use at a time determinable by the death

of the person

...".

§22-4-1.

The act excludes "cemetery lots,

vaults, mausoleum crypts, niches, cemetery burial privileges, and
cemetery space..." (Emphasis added).

Plaintiff claimed that the

exclusion for "mausoleum crypts" did not extend to unconstructed
mausoleum crypts.
The legislature amended §22-4-1 in 1983 to include:
personal property, merchandise, or services
of any nature to be conveyed or delivered at
any time
... including ...unconstructed
mausoleum crypts..."
B.

§22-4-1 f 1971) Required a 75% Trust.
Pre-need sales have been so flagrantly abused in the

cemetery business, that over half the states have enacted preneed laws.

These laws require that money paid under a pre-need

cemetery contract be held in trust.

The case of Utah Funeral

Directors v. Memorial Gardens of the Valleyy

408 P.2d 190, 17

Utah 2d 227 (1965), explains the purpose of these statutes:
10

One of the main purposes of the pre-need laws
is to make sure that after the solicitations
of such contracts, the embalming and funeral
services will be furnished as contracted to
the extent that the trust funds and earnings
can accomplish this. 17 Utah 2d at 232.
State v. Anderson, 408 P.2d 864 (Kan. 1965) added:
[Because of] a great time lag between the
time of beginning and performance . . . there
is
a public interest in the protection of
funds intended for a particular purpose, from
whatever hazard, whether the normal vicissitudes of business, or plain fraud and deceit.
The statute as originally written in 1971 shows from
its face that it meant to cover pre-need arrangements.

The title

refers to trusts for "pre-arranged funeral plans," and indicated
a broad reading of that phrase to include

"any agreement" to

provide property and services in the future at the time of death.
The sale of pre-need mausoleum space fits this intention.
exceptions

list what

property and services.
spaces.

are normally understood

The

to be existing

This would not include pre-need mausoleum

The purpose of protecting pre-need consumers would be

frustrated by a reading excluding pre-need mausoleum sales from
the trust protection.
Defendant's claim was that it was selling
crypts."

"mausoleum

However, defendant did not sell a mausoleum crypt.

It

sold the right to the use of a non-existent piece of personal
property

at

a

time

determined

Defendant

sold

performed

in the future.

a promise

by

the

plaintiff's

to build a crypt

death.

(services) to be

Thus, the 7 5% trust exemption for

"mausoleum crypts" should not apply.
11

C.

If 22-4-1 (1971) Was Unclear, Then The 1983 Revision Should
Apply Retroactively.
The 1983 legislature made explicit that the 75% trust

applied

to unconstructed mausoleum crypts.

The Utah Supreme

Court has held "when the purpose of an amendment is to clarify
the meaning of an earlier enactment, the amendment may be applied
retroactively in pending actions." State, Dept. of Soc. Services
v. Hides, 656 P.2d 998, 1001 (Utah 1982) ..."

Shelter America

Corp. v. Ohio Cas. & Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 843, 845
1987).

(Utah App.

The 1971 version was at least unclear whether the 75%

trust applied to pre-need unconstructed mausoleum crypts.

The

1983 amendments made clear the intent of the prior enactment, and
the amendment should apply in pending actions such as this one.
Further, since the operation of a cemetery is impressed
with a public purpose, any contract implicitly includes a clause
rendering the contract subject to any changes made in the laws.
Diamant v. Mnt. Pleasant Westchester Cemetery Corp., 2 01 N.Y.S.
2d 861 (Sup. 1960); Grove Hill Realty Co. v. Fercliff Ass'n., 198
N.Y.S. 2d 287 (A.D. 1960).

Silver Ktn. Cem. Ass'n v. Simon, 231

N.Y.S. 2d 909 (Sup. Ct. 1962).

Similarly, each contract has an

implied term that the performance of the contract will comply
with any applicable law.
1980).

Thus,

interest

on

the

75% of

Hall v. Karrsn, 632 P. 2d 848 (Utah

Schoneys
her

are

contract

present.
POINT

12

entitled,
payments

at

a minimum, to

from

1983 to the

THERE WAS AMPLE EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT HAD
BREACHED THE SCHONEYS' CONTRACT BY DELAYING
CONSTRUCTION OF THE MOUNTAIN VIEW MAUSOLEUM
A.

Claim for Delay in Construction.
Plaintiffs claimed defendant was obligated to build a

mausoleum at Mountain View "within one year from the date that
the

Public

completed."

Relations

Program

by

dants

defendants

(Tr.

delayed

Development

that

the Public

that

unit

is

at p. 22-24).

Program

Relation

It was

Development

upon sale of 1/2 of the spaces in the
Plaintiff claimed that defen-

the actual completion of

mausoleum spaces.
B.

on

Fifth Amended Complaint, para. 2.)

is completed

mausoleum.

Program

(Mausoleum Sales Agreement, para, headed "Design and

Construction; "
conceded

Development

by

voluntarily

the

Public

abandoning

Relations

sales

of

the

(Fifth Amended Complaint, para. 3-5).

Defendant's Oblioation to Build a Mausoleum Began one Year
After it Stopped Selling Mausoleum Spaces at Mountain View.
The

completion

of

the

Public

Relations

Development

Program was a condition precedent to defendant's performance.
Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d

714

(Utah 1985).

Because the

fulfillment of the conditions was dependent on defendant's acts
(i.e. sales of mausoleum spaces), it was required to make a goodfaith effort to complete the conditions.
School of Business, 560 P.2d 13B3 (Utah 1977).

Connor v. Stevens
When a good faith

effort is not made, the condition is deemed fulfilled.
supra.

Conner,

Thus, defendant's obligation to build began one year from

the time it failed to make a good-faith effort to fulfill the
conditions by selling 1/2 of the spaces.
13

As early as 1975, defendants had abandoned its active
efforts to fulfill the conditions by selling pre-need mausoleum
spaces.

(Keith

reasonably

Hughes

found

that

depo., p. 35).
a

good-faith

A

effort

jury could
to

fulfill

have
the

condition would require at the least an active continuing effort
to sell 1/2 of the spaces.

Defendants put no evidence in the

record that their abandonment was beyond their control.

A jury

could have concluded that defendant's obligation to build was
triggered when efforts to sell 1/2 the spaces were stopped.
Defendant also contended that plaintiff bought space at
Redwood Road and that because a mausoleum was built in 1976,
there was no breach.

(Tr. at p. 13).

However, the Schoneys

alleged that they bought mausoleum space at Mountain View.

This

was supported by the affidavit or Erma Schoney and deposition
testimony of both Erma and George Schoney.

Because the evidence

was conflicting as to whether plaintiffs bought at Mountain View
or Redwoodf the trial court erred by granting summary judgment on
the basis that a mausoleum was timely built at Redwood Road.

POINT
THE SCHONEYS CLAIM THAT DEFENDANT FAILED TO
BUILD THE MAUSOLEUM AS PROMISED SHOULD BE
SENT TO A JURY.
A.

Claim for Breach of Warranty.
Plaintiff

claimed

she

was

mausoleum intended for Mountain view.
para 8.)

shown

a drawing

of

the

(Fifth Amended Complaint,

She alleged that the mauscleum as built was different,
iA

and of inferior quality.

The Mountain View mausoleum was built

in 1985. (Answer to Interrogatory 5f November 24, 1987).
B.

The Statute of Limitations Beoan to Run When the Mountain
View Mausoleum Was Built in 1985.
Defendant contended that plaintiff had bought space at

Redwood and, therefore, the wrongf if any, began upon completion
of the 1976 Redwood mausoleum.

(Tr. at p. 18).

Of course, the

Schoneys' testimony was always that they bought at Mountain View.
Thus, the statute of limitations began to run in 1985 when the
Mountain View mausoleum was constructed.

Defendant made no claim

that plaintiff's claim for breach of warranty was untimely if it
related to the Mountain View mausoleum.
C.

There was No Evidence in the Record that the Mountain View
Mausoleum (As Built) was the Same as the Mausoleum Shown to
Plaintiffs.
There was no evidence in the record that the Mountain

View mausoleum looked like the drawing shown to the plaintiffs in
1973.

Defendant's counsel opined that "the two mausoleums are

substantially the same."

(Tr. p. 17). However, Moore stated at

his deposition that the mausoleum as shown, and the mausoleum as
built, were "absolutely" not the same.

(Moore depo. p. 24).

Moore stated the constructed one was "inferior" and an "eyesore."
(Id. at 24-25).
Because

A jury might or might not share that opinion.

the trial

mausoleum

was

court

built

as

had no basis to decide whether the
represented,

inappropriate.

POINT
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summary

judgment

was

WHETHER THE CHAPEL WAS AVAILABLE FOR THE
SCHONEYS TO USE WAS AN ISSUE OF FACT
PRECLUDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
A.

The Schoneys' Claim
Chapel.
The

cemetery

Schoneys

chapel

Amended

from

Complaint,

for Wrongful Rental of the Cemetery

alleged

that defendant

rented

out the

1977 to 1984 as office

space.

(Fifth

para

31.)

The Schoneys

sought

an order

requiring a restitution of the chapel rental proceeds to the
owners of cemetery plots and mausoleum spaces who were entitled
to use of the chapel..
B.

(Id. at p. 18).

There was no Factual Basis for This Court to Conclude that
the Chaoel was not Rented out and Unavailable for Funeral
Services.
There was no evidence in the record that the chapel

was not rented to Security National Life.

Instead, the evidence

in the record shows that salesmen for defendant were told "the
area that will eventually house the pews and the whole operation
is currently office space."

(Holt depo. p. 42).

Further, if

the chapel was not being rented and was available, why would
defendant substitute use of LDS chapels for funerals?
44).

(Id. at

The only basis the court had to support defendant's motion

was defendant's

counsel's

statement that there was an uncon-

troverted affidavit that there was a chapel available at Mountain
View.

(Tr. at 19, 51).

There is no such affidavit.

The trial

court was unaware of such a basis (Tr. at p. 48). The Schoney's
counsel

specifically

represented

to the trial court that the

chapel was not available because there was an insurance company
in there.

(Tr, at p. 47).
16

The reason that there was next-to-nothing in the record
as to whether the Mountain View chapel was available is because
that claim was first made at oral argument.

The Schoneys had, in

fact, made a formal request for entry onto land for the express
purpose of taking photographs of the chapel filled with desks,
filing cabinets, and etc.

Had either counsel or the court known

of that basis for defendant's motion, an evidentiary record could
have been made.

As it was, all the trial court had was the

assertion of defendant's counsel that a chapel was available, and
the assertion of the Schoney's counsel that the chapel was not
available.

Such is not the stuff of which summary judgments can

be made.
C.

The Schoneys Could Sue to Redress a Past Use of the Cemetery
Chapel for Non-Cemetery Purposes.
A cemetery may not be put to any use inconsistent with

repose of the dead.
App.

Vidrine v. Vidrine, 225 So. 2d 6691 (La.

969); Michels v. Crouch, 122 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. Civ. App.

1938);Wino v. Forest Lawn Cemetery Assn, 101 P.2d

1099 (Cal.

1940); Benson v. Lakewood Cemetery, 267 N.W. 510 (Minn. 19 36) ;
Moore v. U.S. Cremation Co., 9 N.E.2d
Riddell, 106 S.W.

2B2

(Ken. 1907);

795

(N.Y.); Hertle v.

Frank v. Cloverleaf

Park

Assn, 148 A.2d 488 (N.J. 1959); Connolly v. Frobeniurs, 574 P.2d
971 (Kan. App. 1978); Arlington Cem. Co. v. Hoffman, 119 S.5. 696
(Ga.

1961).

This

prohibition

is grounded

cemetery management are trustees.

in the

idea that

See e.g. Dennis v. Glenwood

Cemetery, 130 A. 373 (N.J. 1924); Braun v. Maolewood Cemetery
Assjji, 89 N.W. 872

(Minn. 1902); Mines v. State, 149 S.W. 1058
17

(Tenn. 1911); Cave Hill Cemetery v. Gosnell, 161 S.W. 980 (Ky.
App. 1913).
Use of the cemetery chapel for insurance offices is a
flagrant abuse of the interests and rights of the consumers who
have purchased cemetery lots and mausoleum spaces.

A court of

equity should be available to redress such an abuse,

POINT
THE TRIAL COURT COULD NOT CONCLUDE AS A
MATTER OF LAW THAT NO FRAUD HAD BEEN
PRACTICED ON THE SCHONEYS.
A.

The Schonevs' Claim for Fraud:
The Schoneys alleged that defendant

that
(Fifth

the

Schoneys

Amended

had

purchased

Complaint,

para

specific
18).

had

represented

mausoleum

This

spaces.

allegation

was

supported by the deposition testimony of the Schoneys' that they
selected specific mausoleum spaces when Nordin made the sale to
them.

(George Schoney depo. p. 10-11).

Moore's testimony also

confirmed that specific spaces were sold.
The reality is that defendant sold many more mausoleum
spaces than it actually had.
19).

(Fifth Amended Complaint, para. 17,

This fact was not explained to the Schoneys.
defendant

19).

Actually,

spaces

in 1973 or 1974 (Smith depo. p. 37). This was about the

time the Schoneys purchased.
people

stopped

assigning

(Id. at para.
specific

crypt

Thus, the specific mausoleum spaces

(like the Schoneys) thought they were buying were non-

existent .
18

Defendant's argument to the trial court was that the
Schoneys had "not alleged" there was never a crypt available to
them.

(Tr. at p. 31).

Defendant's intent was to substitute a

crypt space at Redwood Road.

Of course, the Schoneys did not

want "any" crypt; they had purchased a specific crypt space at a
specific location (Mountain View).

The fact that defendant could

have substituted a different crypt in a different location merely
points up the fraud.
consumers

think

substituted.

The tactic is a kind of bait and switch;

they're

getting

one

thing,

but

another

is

The trial court erred by concluding as a matter of

law that the Schoneys could not prove fraud.

POINT
THE SCHONEYS' CLAIM FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS WAS NOT TIMEBARRED.
A.

The Schoneys' Claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress.
The Schoneys pleaded a claim for intentional infliction

of emotional distress in their Second Amended Complaint filed
June 6, 1983 (Count 10).

They repleaded this theory in their

Fifth Amended Complaint of January 26, 1988.
B.

The Statute of Limitations.
Defendants '

ground

for

dismissing

the

count

for

intentional infliction of emotional distress was "the statute of
limitations on that claim has run."

(Tr.

at p. 25). No claim

was made that facts alleged did not state a cause of action.
Defendant claimed that the relation back provision of Rule 15(a)
19

did not apply because the wrong or liability alleged in the Fifth
Amended complaint was different from that in the second Amended
Complaint, and it required different proof.

Defendant calculated

the four-year limitation period from Kay 22, 19 82.

(Tr. at p.

49).
C.

Legal Standard and Standard of Appellate Review.
If the

intentional

infliction count alleged

in the

Fifth Amended Complaint "arose out of the conduct, transaction
or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the
[Second Amended Complaint], the amendment relates back . . . " .
Rule 15(c).

Since the question is answered solely by comparing

the two pleadings, the appellate court simply reviews for error.
D.

T h e S c h o n e v s ' Claim for Intentional I n f l i c t i o n of E m o t i o n a l
Distr ess in the Fi fth Am'ended Complaint Relates Back Under
R u l e 15 f£J_ to the Claim for Intentional Inflict ion inthe

Second Amended Complaint.
Defendant's

counsel

represented

that

the

Schoneys'

claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress in the
Fifth Amended Complaint was a new cause of action brought up for
the first time.

(Tr. p. 25). Actually, the Schoneys

pleaded a

separate claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
in the Second Amended Complaint of June 6, 1983, just over one
year from the culmination of the entire transaction between the
named parties.

(Second Amended Complaint, para. 53). Under Rule

15(c), the claim for intentional infliction in the Fifth Amended
Complaint related back to at least the
The

following

allegations

Complaint show substantial similarity
20

Second Amended Complaint.
in

the

Fifth

Amended

with those in the Second

Amended Complaint.
depositions

of

Included are citations to the April 1, 1983

the Schoneys

for the facts more

alleged in the Fifth Amended Complaint.
of these facts since at least that time.

specifically

Defendant was on notice
The allegations which

are bracketed were taken from the Second Amended Complaint:
[Defendant's advertising program is designed
to promise customers a sense of peace,
comfort and security through the purchase of
"pre-need" mausoleum space and related
services. Plaintiffs have paid money in good
faith.
However, defendants have failed to
provide peace, comfort, and security.]
(Verbatim, Second Amended Complaint, para.
53.)
Defendant's knew, or should have known, that
named plaintiffs were opposed to ground burial for philosophical and personal reasons.
(Erma Schoney depo. p. IB, April , 1983).
[Plaintiffs agreed to a ground burial for
Clinton Wheeler in 1974 in reliance on
defendant's express promise that he would not
be there more than several (less than six)
months.] (George Schoney depo. p. 16). (cf.
Second Amended Complaint,
para. 14,
regarding defendant's scheme to substitute
cheaper ground plots.)
Further, because of the temporary nature of
the interment, his grave was not marked.
(Erma Schoney depo. p.16)
[However, defendants
intentionally or
recklessly delayed building the mausoleum for
years.] (cf 2d. Comolaint^ oara. 12, 13, 20,
43-48.)
Moreover, with the passage cf time, defendants lost track of the location.
(Erma
Schoney depo. p. 16). Ultimately, defendants
were forced to use a long metal probe to
locate the grave. (Id. at 11.)
[Due to the long delay, and defendants'
stated intention not to build the mausoleum,
plaintiffs' purchased other mausoleum space
21

at Sunset Lawn.]
(Id. at 11-12) (Second
Amended Complaint, para 11).
When plaintiff Erma Schoney's mother died,
she was interred at the Sunset Lawn.
Defendants intentionally refused to allow the
father of plaintiff Erma Schoney to be
disinterred, and reinterred at Sunset Lawn
with his wife. (George Schoney depo. p. 4 54 6.)
Finally on the morning of the funeral,
defendants relented and allowed plaintiff
Erma Schoney's father to be transferred. (Id.
at 47-48).
[Defendants' conduct, together with the acts
alleged above, has caused great turmoil and
severe emotional distress to the named
plaintiffs.
Defendants' conduct was done
wilfully and in reckless disregard for their
rights and sensibilities.]
(Second Amended
Complaint, para. 53.)
A reasonable person should have known that
defendants' conduct would cause such severe
emotional distress. (New allegations).
Thus, the allegations in the Fifth Amended Complaint
are nothing more than a compilation of allegations

from the

Second Amended Complaint, as more particularly set forth in the
Schoneys' depositions of April 1, 1983.
POINT
BECAUSE DEFENDANT FAILED TO PROPERLY SERVE A
FORMAL SUGGESTION OF DEATH, THE ACTION WAS
IMPROPERLY DISMISSED AS TO GEORGE SCHONEY'S
ESTATE.
A.

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
Defendant made an oral motion to dismiss the action as

to George Schoney, pursuant to U.R.C.P. 25.

(Tr. at p. 8).

Defendant represented that a suggestion of death upon the record
had been made more than 9 0 days before the hearing.
0.11).

(Tr. at.

Defendant was referring to a statement in its motion for
22

summary

judgment

filed on December 29, 1987.

motion,

however, did

(Id.).

not mention Rule 25, nor

That

argue George

Schoney's death as a basis for dismissal.
B.

No Proper Suooestion of Death Was Ever Made.
A suggestion of death upon the record

pleading.

is a formal

See e.g. Fed. R. Civ. P. Form 30. A passing reference

somewhere in the record to death of a party is insufficient.

In

Blair v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 104 F.R.D. 21 (W.D. Pa. 984) a
reference to death of a party was made in a pleading.

The court

stated:
This Court does not agree that the reference
to plaintiff's death in the November 4, 1983
pleading triggered the running of the 90 day
time limit. Under Rule 25(a), the time for
filing a motion for substitution commences
only after the death of the party is formally
suggested on the record by the filing and
service of a written statement of the fact of
death as provided in Rule 5 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and Form 30. United
States v. Killer Bros. Constr. Co., 505 F.2d
1031, 1034 (10th Cir. 1974); Mobil Oil Corp.
v. Lefkowitz, 454 F. Supp. 59, 70 (S.D.N.Y.
1977). No such formal writing was filed in
the instant case. The reference to the death
of the plaintiff in the pleadings is not
sufficient to trigger the running of the 90
day time period.
Likewise,

in

Pol gov

v.

Anderson,

45

F.R.D.

(E.D.N.Y. 1968), the court held:
A statement made in passing during a
deposition is not "a statement of the fact
of death: within the meaning of Rule 25.
See Official Form 30 Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Substitution may be made prior to
service of the statement. 4 Moore's Federal
Practice
25.-02, p. 62 (1967 Supp.).

23
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Attorneys are sometimes so harassed during
the course of a litigation that they may well
overlook an informal suggestion of death.
When the consequences to the client of a
slightly delayed reaction may be severe and
the burden of providing formal notice is
slight, insistence on the observance of
procedural ritual is justified.
Similarly, an answer to interrogatory is not a proper
suggestion of death:
The incidental mention of the deaths in
answers to interrogatories does not appear to
this Court to have' started the 90-day period
running. Federal Form 30 provides an example
of the proper suggestion; the answers to
interrogatories cited by defendants do not
rise to the required level of formality.
Acri v. Int. Ass'n of Mach. & Aero, wkrs., 5?5 F. Supp 326, 330
(N.D. Cal. 1983) .
No proper suggestion of death was ever made.

A passing

reference to death in an unrelated motion is insufficient.
answer to interrogatory is insufficient.

An

The rules contemplate a

formal pleading specifically referring to the provisions of Rule
25.

See Connelly v. Rathien, 547 P.2d 1336

(Utah 976) where

dismissal was proper because "notice of death was duly made of
record pursuant to Rule 25(a), U.R.C.P.";

Nat. Eouio. Rental

Ltd. v. Whitecraft Unl. Inc., 75 F.R.D. 507 (E.D.N.Y.1977)(service

of

notice

to

file

claim

against estate

is not

proper

suggestion of death).
C.

No Personal Service Was Mace Pursuant to Rule 25.
Rule 25(a)(1) requires service of the suggestion of

death to be made "upon persons not parties in the manner provided
in Rule 4 for the service cf a summons. "

Rule 4, in turn,

requires personal service upon the executor or personal representative of the estate of George Schoney.
parties

Rule 4(e)(1).

"The non-

for whom Rules 25(a)(1) and 4(d)(1) mandate personal

service are evidently
deceased party'."

the 'successors or representatives of the

Fariss v. Lynchburg Foundry, 769 F.2d 958, 962

(4 Cir. 1985).

Defendant offered no evidence that it had served

the non-party/

i.e. the estate of George Schoney.

Defendant

offered no evidence that an executor or personal representative
had ever been appointed for George Schoney's estate.
Service upon George Schoney's counsel was not sufficient.
Service on decedent's attorney above was
inadequate.
The attorney's agency to act
ceases with the death of his client, see
Restatement (Second) of Agency
120(1)(1958)
and he has no power to continue or terminate
an action on his own initiative. Because the
attorney is neither a party nor a legal
successor or representative of the estate, he
has no authority to move for substitution
under Rule 25(a)(1), as the courts have
repeatedly recognized." Fariss v. Lunchburg
Foundry, supra, 769 F.2d at 962.
Also holding that the deceased's attorney

"is not a

representative of the deceased party in the sense contemplated
by Rule 25(a)(1)" is Rende v. Kav, 415 F.2d 963 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
See also Brown v. Must a in, 30 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 534 (4 Cir.
1980)(decedent's attorney not a party or successor to party who
can file suggestion of death); Al-Jurci v. Rochefelbs, 88 F.R.D.
244 (W.D.N.Y.1980)(service must be made on estate unless estate's
attorney agrees and is authorized to accept service of process.)
Because

George

Schoneyrs

attorney
25

does

not

automatically

represent his estate, defendant has never properly served George
Schoney's estate.
POINT
DEFENDANT'S OFFER OF JUDGMENT DID NOT MOOT
THE SCHONEY'S CLAIMS
A.

The Trial Court Dismissed All the Schoney's Claims Because
Defendant Offered to Rescind the Contract and Pay Restitution in the Amount of the Purchase Price Plus Interest.
Defendant made an oral offer of judgment at the summary

judgment hearing (Tr. at p. 13). The amount was $4,000 and was
calculated by returning the money paid by the Schoney's plus
interest.

(Tr. at p. 19).

Defendant seemed to argue

return

of the money the Schoneys paid, plus

"moot"

all

their

damage

claims.

(Id.).

that

interest, would
The

trial

court

apparently agreed and held that the Schoneys could never recover
more than the $4,000 offered.
B.

(Tr. at p. 51).

The Schonevs Did Not Seek Rescission and Restitution;
Instead They Sougnt to Affirm the Contract and Recover
Damaoes.
The

Schoney's

Fifth Amended

Complaint

recision and a refund of the money they had paid.
sought interest on the money they paid

never

sought

Instead, they

(damages for delay in

building the Mountain View Mausoleum); the difference in value
between

the

mausoleum

as

shown

and

the

mausoleum

as

built

(damages) and their share of the money earned by defendant in
renting rhe cemetery chapel (damages for loss of use). Additionally r the Schoney's sought an accounting of trust funds, which
does not depend on a finding of breach cf contract.
also

sought

damages

for

buying
26

substitute

The Schoneys

mausoleum

spaces

("cover" damages) and damages for their mental and emotional
distress*

Every remedy sought (except the trust accounting) was

based on damages for breach of contract or tort.

The Schoneys

made no request for rescission of the contract.
C.

Election of Remedies Is Dp to the Schoneys, Not Defendant
and the Trial Court.
Ey offering rescission, defendant attempted to force an

election of remedies on the Schoneys. Obviously, defendant feels
it is cheaper to give the Schoneys their money back than to
account

for building

an inferior mausoleum,

renting

out the

cemetery chapel, abusing trust funds and obligations, and for
mental distress caused by
mausoleum.

the lengthy delay in building the

However, defendants are not allowed the option of

choosing the least expensive remedy.

If a plaintiff's damages

exceed the purchase price, the plaintiff is free to seek damages.
A plaintiff

is entitled to an election of remedies

"free of fraud or imposition."

Angeles v. First Interstate Bank

of Utah, 571 P.2d 772, 778 (Utah 1263).
It is axiomatic that where a civil wrong
gives rise to two or more causes of action,
the choice of remedy is vested in the victim,
not in the wrongdoer . . • It does not lie
in the mouth of the wrongdoer ro demand that,
his victim be limited to that cause of action
which is most beneficial to tne wrong-doer.
Gherman v. Colburn, 140 Cal. Rptr. 330, 343

(App. Ct. 1977)

(Emphasis in the original.)
The choice cf remedies belongs to the one who
has been defrauded and may not be forced upon
him by the wrongdoer.

27

Moore & Co. v. Williams, 657 P.2d 984, 988 (Colo App. 1982).

See

also Mills v. Brown, 568 S.W.2d 100 (Tenn. 1978) (purchaser's
choice whether to seek rescission or damages; not up to vendor);
Kino v. Lindlay, 697 S.W. 2d 749 (Tex. App. 1985) ( "Defendant may
not dictate to a plaintiff which remedy he should pursue").
D.

There was No Evidence that the Schoney's Damages Could Not
Exceed $4,000.
There was no basis for the trial court to conclude as a

matter of law that the damages alleged would not exceed $4,000.
Damages such as mental and emotional distress are not capable of
ascertainment on summary judgment anyway, and must be left to a
jury.

Thus, defendant's offer of settlement was no basis for

dismissing the Schoney's complaint.
A procedure similar to that of Judge Moffat's was found
reversible error in Jarrett v. G.L. Harper & Sons, Inc., 235 S.E.
2d 362

(W. Va. 1977).

After picking a jury, the defendant

confessed judgment in the amount of the plaintiff's out-of-pocket
expenses.

After colloquy with plaintiff's counsel, the trial

court dismissed the case.

The appellate court reversed:

The record discloses no explanation about how
the trial court arrived at his decision to
force acceptance of this confession of judgment upon plaintiffs. . . [Wjhen a defendant's offer of judgment only partially
satisfies the plaintiff's claim for damages
and plaintiff either rejects the tender or
accepts it as part payment only, the court
must consider the offer withdrawn and submit
the case to the jury, whereas here one has
been demanded.
Id. at 363, 364.
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Because

the offer of

satisfaction and w ^

judgment was

only

a partial

rejected by the Schoneysf the trial court

had no choice but to send the matter to a jury.
E.

The Schoneys' Complaint Should Not Have Been Discussed Even
if their Damages Could Not Exceed $4,000,
Assuming

for

sake

of

argument

that

the

Schoneys'

damages could not exceed $4,000, defendant's offer of judgment
could not form the basis for dismissing their complaint.
dismissal

The

deprived the Schoneys of both their cause of action

and the $4,000 which defendant offered. An offer of judgment "is
neither a defense to an action nor a bar to further prosecution
of a suit."

Katz Drug Co. v. Comm. Standard Ins., 647 S.W.2d

831, 840 (Mo. App. 1983).

"Defendant's reliance upon its offer

of judgment as constituting an acceptable basis for the grant of
summary judgment is misplaced.

[It] is not a defense to an

action and does not bar the further prosecution
[Citation omitted].
2d 871, 876

of a suit.

Killer v United Security Ins. Co., 496 S.W.

(Mo. App. 1973).

An offer of judgment is not a

pleading, deposition, admission or affidavit which will support
summary judgment.

Id.

What Judge Moffat did must be distinguished from the
procedure occasionally used in class actions of offering judgment
in excess of the named plaintiff's damages.

This is done after

class certification is denied and is done to avoid a useless
trial.

In those cases, the named plaintiff gets a judgment in

his favor for the full amount of his individual damages.

Even

then, "a court may not impose upon a plaintiff a settlement that
29

deprives him of relief to which he could be entitled after
trial.

[Citation omitted]."

(2d Cir. 1983).

Kline v. Wolf, 702 F.2d 400, 405

Part of the relief sought in a class action is

class certification.

Thus, a judgment in favor of an indivi-

dual named plaintiff must allow for appeal of the denial of
class certification.

Roper v. Consurve, Inc., 578 F.2d 1106

(5th Cir. 1978) affirmed sub. nom.

Deposit Guar. Nat. Bank v

Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 100 S. Ct. 1166, 63 L. Ed.2d 427 (1980).
This

prevents

accountability

a
by

large
paying

defendant
off

from

the

named

avoiding

class-wide

plaintiff's

claims

through an unaccepted offer of judgment.
In this case, however, defendant used its unaccepted
offer of judgment to avoid both class liability and liability
to the Schoneys.

This approach deprives the Schoneys of both

the offered judgment and their causes of action.

No plausible

reasoning can support this result.
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day of ]fi/lfyXA,

, 1989.
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DAN IEL F. BERTCH

-'-This brief is submitted in its current form pursuant to
the order of March 7, 1989. Appellant submits it under protest
that the order is incorrect and that the hearing panel will be
unfairly hampered by the abbreviated nature of the brief.
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